Recently Lee et al. proposed an efficient verifier-based key agreement protocol for three parties without server's public key. Lee et al. claimed the proposed protocol could resist various attacks and provide the perfect forward secrecy. However, in this paper, authors shall show that their protocol suffers from the impersonation attack. At the same time, authors shall propose an improved method to withstand the above attack.
Following and extending the conceptions of Bellovin and Merrit's protocol, many three-party protocols were proposed [2, 5, [7] [8] [9] [10] . However, the previous protocols still existed some security problems such as on-line undetectable password guessing attack [4] and off-line password guessing attack [7] etc. Not only that, some protocols also required server's public key to protect the shared password [7, 10] .
For enhancing the efficiency and preventing various attacks, Lee et al. [6] proposed an efficient verifier-based key agreement protocol for three parties without server's public key. Lee et al.'s protocol provides the perfect forward secrecy by employing the conceptions of the Diffie-Hellman scheme [3] and each client only needs to remember a memorable password. The protocol is suitable for some applications of low computations.
However, authors shall show that Lee et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the impersonation attack without making an off-line password guessing attack. At the same time, authors shall propose an improved method to withstand the above attack.
Next Section, authors shall go over Lee et al.'s protocol and show that their protocol's weakness. In Section 3, authors shall propose an improvement. Finally, authors shall make a conclusion for this paper.
Review of Lee et al.'s protocol
In this section, authors shall review Lee et al.'s protocol show that the protocol's weakness. Before the introduction of the protocol, authors first denote some parameters as follows.
A, B and AS denotes the identities of Alice, Bob and Authentication Server respectively. p is a large prime and g is a generator in the cyclic group Z p *. Authors omit "mod p" from expressions for simplicity.
h() denotes a collision-free one-way hash function. 
Fig. 1 Introduction of Lee et al.'s protocol

Weakness on Lee et al.'s protocol
Once Alice's verifier v A has stolen by the attacker. The attacker can impersonate Bob to communicate with Alice by performing the following steps. We use figure 2 to introduce our attack.
Step 1': When Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Alice sends (A, X A ) to Bob. Now, the attacker intercepts it and sends (A, X' A = v A ) to Bob.
Step 2': Bob forwards the received message with (B, X B ) to AS and sends X ⊕ v A to Alice, where c' is chosen by the attacker.
Step 5': The attacker computes K' AS = X SA ⊕ v A = (v A ) c and sends to AS. We can find v'
Step 6': The attacker computes
Step 7': Alice computes , K impersonates Bob to communicate with Alice.
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